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A tentative answer (which will be further detailed in the final section of the paper) is as follows. Any definition of patent breadth involves the idea that narrowing patent breadth leads to more competition in the product market. This lowers the flow of profits earned by the innovator and may increase those earned by non-innovators, thus reducing the incentive to innovate. The effect on social welfare is, however, ambiguous. It might happen, as in Klemperer's example, that social welfare does not increase. If that is the case, then clearly maximum breadth is optimal. If instead, as is more likely, social welfare does increase, the point is whether it increases more or less rapidly than the incentive to innovate decreases as the patent is narrowed. This depends on the nature of competition. Competition of the Bertrand variety in a homogeneous product market, which reduces the equilibrium price but preserves production efficiency, is the most efficient type. In this case, the deadweight loss decreases more rapidly than the incentive to innovate and therefore the G-S result applies. But focussing on Bertrand competition may underestimate the value of breadth relative to length, because other forms of competition may not be so efficient. For instance with Cournot competition, narrowing the breadth of the patent tends to increase the output of less efficient firms which may be undesirable. In such cases, maximum patent breadth may turn out to be optimal.
Throughout the paper, we consider the case of a single invention. The results can be applied to a group of independent inventions, but when there is a sequence of related innovations, important dynamic problems arise which would considerably complicate the analysis.3
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section II, we describe several possible interpretations of what may be meant by patent "breadth". In section III, the patent race is analysed and the incentives to innovate are identified in terms of post-innovation profits. Section IV extends G-S's result to this richer setting. Section V illustrates by examples. Section VI interprets the results and concludes the paper.
II. CONCEPTS OF PATENT "BREADTH"1
While the concept of length of a patent is clearcut, what may be meant by patent "breadth" is less straightforward. In this section, we briefly 3See Merges and Nelson [1994] , Green and Scotchmer [1995] and Chang [1995] for a discussion and analysis of some of these problems. 0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996. illustrate some possible interpretations-and measures-of the breadth of a patent. 4 First, consider the case of a process innovation. To fix ideas, assume that marginal costs are constant and that before the innovation all firms have the same cost c. Then, the innovating firm reduces its own cost to c -d, where d measures the cost improvement. A wide patent implies that the new production process cannot be imitated and therefore the noninnovating firms will stick to their pre-innovation cost c. But if the patent is more narrowly defined, one can imagine that even the non-innovating firms can develop similar processes without infringing the patent and therefore reduce their costs to a certain extent. The breadth of the patent may be measured by the fraction of the cost reduction that does not spill out as freely available technology to the non-innovating firms. Thus, denoting the breadth of the patent by 1 -a, with 0 < ac < 1, the non innovating firms will have a marginal cost equal to c -ad. This is the interpretation suggested by Nordhaus [1972] . The same idea applies to the case of quality improvements.
Second, consider Klemperer's case of a product innovation with differentiated products. Then one may measure the breadth of a patent by the distance (in some characteristics space) between the patented product and the products that other firms can sell without infringing the patent. In this context, a wider patent implies a higher demand curve for the patentee. The exact way in which the demand curve shifts as the breadth of the patent varies depends on the structure of the market.
Third, a wider patent may mean that it is more costly to imitate the innovation. Then one can measure the breadth of a patent by means of the cost of imitation. This is the route followed by Gallini [1992] , who assumes that the cost of imitation is fixed.
Fourth, the breadth of a patent may determine the number of applications of an innovation in independent markets which are reserved for the patentee, as in Matutes et al. [1996] .
More generally, our analysis can be applied when there are two instruments available to reward the innovator. For instance, assume as in Tandon [1982] that there is compulsory licensing of the innovation. Then the royalty rate is an additional instrument that can be used along with the patent's life, analogously to the breadth of the patent.
To encompass all these (and possibly other) interpretations of the patent breadth, we index by a, with 0 < c < 1, the degree of dissemination of technological knowledge allowed by the patent: ac = 0 means maximum protection against imitation and c = 1 means that the patent is so narrowly defined that there is actually free access to the new technology. Thus (1 -a) is a measure of the breadth of the patent.5
III. THE PATENT RACE AND THE INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE
In the literature cited in the introduction, the incentive to innovate is identified with the prize accruing to the patentee, i.e., the discounted sum of its post-innovation profits. This identification may be appropriate in some contexts; for instance, when there is only one firm doing R&D. Alternatively, it may be appropriate if the patent race is modelled according to the "winner takes all" assumption as in Loury [1979] and Lee and Wilde [1980] . In these models, the prize to the losers of the patent race is zero.6
However, in a more general setting one must take into account the possibility that the losers of the patent race get positive profits in the postinnovation equilibrium (and also, although this turns out to be less relevant to the issue addressed in this paper, that before the innovation firms make positive profits).7 Moreover, since one must allow the length of the patent to be finite, even if the post-innovation profits of the losers are zero while the innovation is protected by the patent, the prize to the losers may be positive for they may get positive profits after the patent has expired. In these cases, as shown by Beath et al. [1989] , the equilibrium level of R&D is determined by the "profit incentive" (i.e., the difference between the patentee's profits and its pre-innovation profits) and the "competitive threat" (i.e., the difference between the profits to the winner and to the losers). Therefore, the incentives to innovate are not simply measured by the flow of profits accruing to the patentee.8
To summarise: fixing the incentive to innovate is equivalent to fixing the discounted profits of the innovating firm if there is just one firm doing 5 G-S use the post-innovation profits of the innovating firm (before the patent expires) as a general measure of the breadth of the patent. We prefer to take the breadth of the patent explicitly as a parameter, because this facilitates the presentation and discussion of the examples. Clearly, though, when the post-innovation profits of the patentee are a strictly increasing function of a, the "reduced form" approach of G-S is equivalent to ours. 6This is the appropriate approach when firms doing R&D are pure laboratories which patent the innovation and then license the new technology to other firms operating in the downstream product market. By way of contrast, we consider vertically integrated firms which do R&D and compete in the product market. 7Think for instance of the case of a non drastic cost reducing innovation, when firms are quantity-setting Cournot players in the product market. For an analysis of this case, see Delbono and Denicol6 [1991] and example 1 below. 8Another possible justification of the "winner takes all" hypothesis consists in assuming Bertrand competition in a homogeneous product market with constant marginal costs. Then, before the innovation-when they share the same technology-all firms make zero profits, and after the innovation the winner, which has reduced its own cost, will be the only active firm. Moreover, profits will again fall to zero after the patent expires. R&D or if profits are positive for the innovating firm alone before the patent expires. Since these assumptions appear to be quite restrictive, we shall remove them and explicitly consider a race for a patentable innovation between n competing firms which are symmetrically placed at the outset.
Each firm i invests in R&D an amount xi per unit of time; x, is a flow cost that firm i pays until one player succeeds.9 Assuming an exponential distribution, the probability of being successful at a date T prior to date t is Pr(T < t) = 1 -e-h ( (6) is the constraint for the social welfare maximisation problem we shall study in the next section.
Denote the expression inside square brackets in (6) by I, i.e.
(7) I = (n -1)h(xi) (t*w -4L) + r(r* -) Equation (6) says that to obtain a pre-specified level of R&D in the equilibrium of the patent race, the discounted value of I for the duration of the patent must be kept constant. Notice that I can be interpreted as a measure of the incentive to innovate of firms engaged in the patent race. It is a weighted average of a modified "profit incentive" 13 (t*w -7r**) and the competitive threat (4* -4*). The weight of the competitive threat is (n -1)h(x&), that is the instantaneous probability that firm i loses the patent race. This makes intuitive sense: the more likely it is that some other firm wins the race, the more important the competitive threat becomes. If instead n = 1, so that the only firm doing R&D would be sure to win the race, only the profit incentive would matter. Generally speaking, constraint (6) differs from that considered by G-S [1990] and Klemperer [1990] , who assumed a constant present value of the 0 It may be easily checked that the second order condition holds. " Since n and h are given, fixing x also implies that the expected date of innovation is predetermined.
12We assume K > 0. This means that if the innovation is not protected, the incentive to innovate falls short of the level required to stimulate the desired amount of R&D investment.
13 Actually, the profit incentive as defined by Beath et al. is (7r* -7r).
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996.
patentee's profit. By inspection, the two constraints coincide if n = 1; alternatively, they coincide if 7r** = * = 0, for then both constraints require that zit* be constant.
IV. CONDITIONS FOR MAXIMUM OR MINIMUM PATENT LENGTH
In this section we extend the G-S analysis deriving a sufficient condition for the optimal patent length to be maximum (i.e., infinite) or minimum.
Recall that (1 -a) is a measure of the breadth of the patent. Let S denote the flow of social welfare, i.e., the sum of producers' and consumers' surplus. Generally speaking, social welfare S and the postinnovation profits n* and 4* depend upon a. We assume that 4*'(a) < 0 and n4'Q() > 0.14 Recall also that, under our parameterisation, ax = 1 describes the situation after time T when the patent expires.15 Then clearly 7ir*(1) = 4*(1) = lr** which implies I(1) = 0. Moreover, I'(a) < 0.
Regarding S(a), the most natural assumption would be that instantaneous social welfare decreased with the breadth of the patent, i.e., S'(a) > 0. However, there are non pathological examples where the opposite is true for some a's. One example is Klemperer's [1990] model when all consumers have inelastic demand. They can buy a fixed quantity of the good either from the innovator which produces a high quality good or from imitators which sell inferior brands. A broader patent reduces the market share of imitators and therefore increases social welfare. As another example, consider the case of quantity competition between two firms in the product market: if the cost gap between the high cost firm and the low cost firm is very large, social welfare may decrease if the patent is narrowed.16 In both cases, S(0) > S(oa) for a small; in Klemperer's example, moreover, S(0) = S(l). In what follows, we shall explicitly state when condition S'(a) > 0 is assumed to hold. However, we do assume that S(a) < S(1).
The social welfare maximisation problem may be stated as follows: Choose a and T so as to maximise total discounted social welfare; that is: where D(c) = S(1) -S(ox) denotes the deadweight loss resulting from a patent of breadth a, again subject to (6). Equation (6) defines cx as a function of T. Let T denote the value of T that solves equation (6) for cx = 0;7 similarly, let a < 1 denote the value of oc that solves equation (6) when T tends to oo.
In words, the social problem is to choose the patent's length and breadth so as to minimise the discounted deadweight loss over the lifetime of the patent, under the constraint of generating a given incentive to innovate. An increase in the length of a patent (and hence in z) multiplies by the same factor both the present value of the deadweight loss D(a) and that of the incentive I(a). Therefore, if the constraint is binding, the optimal patent's breadth is the one that minimises the ratio *f(a) = D(a)/I(a).
Clearly, this presupposes that S'(a) > 0. If social welfare were not decreasing in the breadth of the patent, the constraint (6) would not bind and maximum patent breadth would be optimal.18 More generally, there cannot be an interior solution a* to the social problem with S'(a*) < 0.
Assume that S'(a*) < 0 so that the constraint (6) is binding. We have A special case of this proposition arises when the losers of the R&D race have zero profits until the patent expires, i.e., i4 = 0, or when n = 1. In these cases I"(a) = Hit* "(a), with H constant, and we have the G-S result.
Notice that Proposition 1 provides sufficient conditions for maximum 17We assume that this value exists and is finite; that is, that in case of maximum patent protection the innovation is sufficiently valuable to induce the competing firms to invest in R&D at least the predetermined amount nx. 18 We are here interpreting the constraint as saying that at least a specified R&D effort must be guaranteed, i.e., as a weak inequality. or minimum patent breadth. In specific applications, a direct approach (i.e., explicit minimisation of *f(a)) may prove more powerful. The advantage of the result stated in Proposition 1 is that it is more general and easy to apply, as we shall see in the next section.
V. EXAMPLES
In this section we study some examples which illustrate the application of Proposition 1. Nonetheless, since it is not optimal to set a in the interval where S'(a) < 0, we can proceed assuming that constraint (6) is binding.
Twice differentiating the expressions for post-innovation profits yields = -d2 and 7,4" = ' d2. This implies that I"(oa) > 0 if r > 3h(xi).
The above discussion may be summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the case of a cost reducing innovation in a linear homogeneous Cournot duopoly with constant marginal costs, the optimal patent length is minimum and the optimal patent breadth is maximum if r > 3h(x).
Example 2. Consider a product innovation in a vertically differentiated industry. We assume that each consumer buys one unit of a good obtaining utility. (12), the patent breadth-length mix does not affect discounted overall social welfare.
Example 3. Tandon [1982] studies the optimal patent length in the presence of compulsory licensing of the innovation. He shows that, with a linear demand function, the optimal patent length is infinite. We provide a new derivation and a generalisation of this result.21 Let Q(p) be the demand function and assume that the innovation makes it possible to produce the good at a constant marginal cost c. The innovation must be licensed at a royalty fee which is determined by the regulator. Here we take the fee as a measure of the patent's breadth a. More precisely, let PM denote the monopoly price corresponding to the constant marginal cost c. Clearly, an unregulated innovator will find it optimal to set the royalty fee at (PM -c). Let (1 -x) be the fraction of the optimal fee that the patentee is allowed by the regulator to charge. Then the good will be sold competitively at an equilibrium price equal to the production cost plus the royalty fee, i.e., p = c + (1 -a) (PM -c). In this case, a = 0 means that the innovator is actually unregulated, whereas a = 1 means that there is complete dissemination of technological knowledge.
The profits of the innovating firm before the patent expires are zw = (1 -oa) ( Example 4. We consider now an example which is a simplified version of the Gallini [1992] model. Gallini [1992] assumes that there is only one firm doing R&D and that either the innovation creates a new product or, equivalently, that the cost innovation is drastic. However, the innovation can be imitated at a fixed cost h, and there is free entry of imitators. Therefore, in the post-innovation equilibrium the profit of the innovator will equal h until the patent expires. Then imitation becomes costless and profits are driven to zero. In this framework, the breadth of the patent may be taken to influence the cost of imitation h. To be more precise, 21Tandon [1982] works with a linear demand function, though he claims that his result extends to more general demand functions. where p is price, 0 is the quality level, and d is the distance that he has to travel.26
Since before the patent race the two firms are symmetric, we can assume without loss of generality that firm 1 innovates. Then, 01 = 0+0 and 02 = 0 + 20. We assume that 0 is high enough for the market to be covered. The two firms compete in prices.
In One can then easily verify that n"1(2) = ir"2(2) = 02/18, so that I"(a) > 0 and S"(a) = 5/36(02/t) > 0. We can therefore state: Proposition 6. In a market with linear transport costs and horizontal differentiation, the optimal breadth of the patent is maximum and the optimal length is minimum.
A variant of this example assumes that the two firms produce the same quality but can change their location. More precisely, suppose the locations are initially fixed at 0 and 1, respectively, but the two firms compete for an innovation which gives the capability to move towards the centre.28 The innovating firm can move to b (or 1 -b); however, the innovation can be imitated to a certain extent, so that the non-innovating firm can also move towards the centre to 1 -ab (or ab). In this example it turns out that I"(a) > 0 and S"(a) < 0 so that neither of the sufficient conditions of Proposition 1 hold; indeed, the social problem has an interior solution.
26In all the previous examples, narrowing the patent does not enlarge the technological possibilities of the industry as a whole, though it may enlarge those of particular firms. In other words, if a social planner could choose the first best allocation, this would not be affected by the breadth of the patent. The positive effect on social welfare (if any) is brought about by the more intense competition associated with a narrower patent. This example features a direct technological benefit of narrowing the patent breadth, as well as the indirect benefit associated with more intense competition. The reason is that when 0 < t, it is socially efficient that some consumers continue to buy the low quality good.
27
assume that the innovation is not drastic, that is 0 < 3t. 28As is well known, in the Hotelling model with linear transport cost both firms have an incentive to move towards the centre of the market. One has to assume b < 1/4 to avoid problems of non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have extended the analysis of the optimal patent breadth-length mix to the case of a patent race where the "winner takes all" assumption may not hold.29 We have also analysed a series of examples which show that there is no presumption that either infinite or minimum patent length is most likely to be optimal. Our discussion has clarified the relationship between G-S's "general" result on the optimality of an infinite patent duration and Klemperer and Gallini's counterexamples. In Klemperer's example, social welfare is (locally) increasing in the breadth of the patent;30 in Gallini's model (at least under certain simplifying assumptions) social welfare is convex in the patentee's profit. By way of contrast, G-S's result requires that social welfare be decreasing and concave in the patent breadth.
We have shown that the patent breadth-length optimal mix depends in a subtle way (involving second derivatives) on the relationship between social welfare and post-innovation profits, on the one hand, and the breadth of the patent, on the other hand. And economic theory places no restriction on the concavity of these functions. Thus it should not be surprising that different models and examples yield seemingly contradictory conclusions. But what is the economic intuition underlying these diverse results? That is, what are the economic forces which in any particular example determine the optimal shape of the patent?
We suggest the following answer. Generally speaking, reducing the breadth of a patent leads to more competition in the product market after the innovation. We know that more competition is not always socially desirable. Whatever "more competition" exactly means, it may involve social costs, like duplication of entry costs, inefficient production, and so on. We also know that different forms of competition exhibit various degrees of efficiency; for instance, in a homogeneous market Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition.
Clearly, if the additional competition brought about by narrowing the patent is on balance socially costly, it is optimal to award patents of maximum breadth. And, for a reduction in the patent breadth to be socially optimal it does not suffice that more competition increases social welfare: it must increase social welfare more than it reduces the incentive to innovate of the firms participating in the patent race.
G-S show that this is indeed the case with Bertrand competition and a 29 Another paper where the "winner takes all" assumption is not made is Waterson [1990] . However, his analysis focuses on other issues, like the choice whether to patent the innovation or not or the possibility of litigation over the scope of the patent.
30This is not to say that Klemperer's model, which is quite general, cannot exhibit cases where a maximum breadth is optimal even if social welfare is decreasing in the breadth of the patent. Our comment applies to his example with inelastic individual demand only. C Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996. homogeneous product. But this is the case most favourable to the G-S thesis, as in this case competition reduces the equilibrium price while preserving production efficiency. Since competition is not always so efficient, this result cannot be deemed a general one. Loosely speaking, the less efficient is the type of competition prevailing in the product market, the more likely it is that broad and short patents are socially optimal. Broad patents reduce the output of less efficient firms with Cournot competition and avoid wasteful duplication of entry costs when imitation is costly. With differentiated products and price competition, broad patents generally involve social costs but may be very effective in widening the difference between the winners' and losers' rewards, thus increasing the incentive to innovate at a relatively low cost. VINCENZO 
